collateral
发表于 2025-3-28 17:00:03
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阐明
发表于 2025-3-28 20:02:22
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BIAS
发表于 2025-3-29 01:48:01
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牢骚
发表于 2025-3-29 04:43:51
A New Security Model for Authenticated Key Agreementas the (H)MQV protocols, is particularly suited for distributed implementations wherein a tamper–proof device is used to store long–lived keys, while session keys are used on an untrusted host machine. The SMQV protocol meets our security definition under the Gap Diffie–Hellman assumption and the Random Oracle model.
云状
发表于 2025-3-29 07:49:22
Differential Fault Analysis of LEXl assumes that the attacker is able to flip a random bit of the internal state of the cipher but cannot control the exact location of the induced fault. Our attack requires 40 faults, and recovers the secret key with 2. operations.
晚间
发表于 2025-3-29 13:03:01
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严峻考验
发表于 2025-3-29 19:00:39
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single
发表于 2025-3-29 22:08:52
Generalized RC4 Key Collisions and Hash Collisionsy of key collision, key length and hamming distances which yield the colliding key pairs. Also we show how to make use of the RC4 key collision patterns to find collisions of RC4-Hash function which was proposed in INDOCRYPT 2006. Some concrete experimental results (RC4-Hash collision and RC4 colliding key pairs) are also given in this paper.
corn732
发表于 2025-3-30 00:28:08
How to Pair with a Human a ., which is a protocol that allows two users to verify if they are both human, in such a way that if one of them is not a human, then he does not learn whether the other one is human, or not..To construct this tool we use a Universally-Composable Password Authenticated Key Agreement of Canetti et al. (EUROCRYPT 2005).
annexation
发表于 2025-3-30 04:52:18
Algorithmic Tamper-Proof Security under Probing Attacksan adversary who can tamper with the memory content of a hardware device. In this paper, we solve an open problem stated in their paper, and also consider whether a device can be secured against an adversary who can both tamper with its memory and probe a few memory locations or wires at a time. Our results are as follows: