Agoraphobia
发表于 2025-3-21 18:04:19
书目名称Scissors and Rock影响因子(影响力)<br> http://impactfactor.cn/if/?ISSN=BK0862839<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Scissors and Rock影响因子(影响力)学科排名<br> http://impactfactor.cn/ifr/?ISSN=BK0862839<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Scissors and Rock网络公开度<br> http://impactfactor.cn/at/?ISSN=BK0862839<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Scissors and Rock网络公开度学科排名<br> http://impactfactor.cn/atr/?ISSN=BK0862839<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Scissors and Rock被引频次<br> http://impactfactor.cn/tc/?ISSN=BK0862839<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Scissors and Rock被引频次学科排名<br> http://impactfactor.cn/tcr/?ISSN=BK0862839<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Scissors and Rock年度引用<br> http://impactfactor.cn/ii/?ISSN=BK0862839<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Scissors and Rock年度引用学科排名<br> http://impactfactor.cn/iir/?ISSN=BK0862839<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Scissors and Rock读者反馈<br> http://impactfactor.cn/5y/?ISSN=BK0862839<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Scissors and Rock读者反馈学科排名<br> http://impactfactor.cn/5yr/?ISSN=BK0862839<br><br> <br><br>
EVADE
发表于 2025-3-21 23:20:59
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陶瓷
发表于 2025-3-22 02:39:38
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44823-3strategic decision problems; strategic behaviour and game theory; decision making and game theory; auct
免除责任
发表于 2025-3-22 05:49:30
978-3-030-44822-6Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
冒号
发表于 2025-3-22 12:38:29
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该得
发表于 2025-3-22 13:46:13
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Apraxia
发表于 2025-3-22 20:14:14
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性满足
发表于 2025-3-23 00:25:39
,The Prisoners’ Dilemma, but Who Are the Players?,sions. Mr. Taubman served ten months of a one-year prison sentence; Ms. Brooks was given six months’ house arrest, a $350,000 fine, and 1000 h of community service. She pleaded guilty to price-fixing and then testified against her boss, Alfred Taubman. No one was charged at Christie’s, which had blo
finite
发表于 2025-3-23 05:27:40
Which Strategy to Choose?,cases a singleton is left. In contrast to this operation, the concept of rationalizable strategies leads to an expansion of the set of justifiable strategy choices. A strategy x is rationalizable if it is a best reply to strategy y and y is a best reply to a strategy z. In a Nash equilibrium (x, y),
Heart-Rate
发表于 2025-3-23 07:51:46
Forever and a Day,wing periods as long as the strategy of the opponent chooses “cooperate.” However, if the strategy selects “defect,” then TIT-FOR TAT presents “defect” as well. The strategy resulting in the . of payoff points wins. This condition is different than what defines success in the Iterated Prisoners’ Dil