FLAX 发表于 2025-3-26 21:34:12
Cost Sharing and Strategyproof Mechanisms for Set Cover Games study the cost sharing for a single set cover game, which does not have a budget-balanced core. We show that there is no cost allocation method that can always recover more than . of the total cost if we require the cost sharing being a core. Here . is the number of all players to be served. We givenchant 发表于 2025-3-27 01:47:34
On Weighted Balls-into-Bins Games. We are particularly interested in questions that are concerned with the . of ball weights, and the . in which balls are allocated. Do any of these parameters influence the maximum expected load of any bin, and if yes, then how?.The problem of weighted balls is of practical relevance. Balls-into-bi享乐主义者 发表于 2025-3-27 05:38:46
http://reply.papertrans.cn/87/8604/860328/860328_33.png凶猛 发表于 2025-3-27 09:52:11
The Variable Hierarchy of the ,-Calculus Is Strict finite strongly connected structures. Since hard formulae for the level . of the existential hierarchy belong to this family, it follows that the bounded variable fragments of the full modal .-calculus form a hierarchy of strictly increasing expressive power.cavity 发表于 2025-3-27 14:59:17
http://reply.papertrans.cn/87/8604/860328/860328_35.png鞭子 发表于 2025-3-27 19:46:24
http://reply.papertrans.cn/87/8604/860328/860328_36.pngPalatial 发表于 2025-3-28 01:02:48
http://reply.papertrans.cn/87/8604/860328/860328_37.png吹牛需要艺术 发表于 2025-3-28 04:35:46
http://reply.papertrans.cn/87/8604/860328/860328_38.pngJAUNT 发表于 2025-3-28 08:18:26
http://reply.papertrans.cn/87/8604/860328/860328_39.pngBaffle 发表于 2025-3-28 11:01:23
Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Scheduling Selfish Related MachinesApproximation Scheme (FPTAS) algorithm, and a suitable payment scheme that yields a truthful mechanism for the problem. This result, which is based on converting FPTAS to monotone FPTAS, improves a previous result of Auletta et al, who showed a (4+.)-approximation truthful mechanism.