无能性
发表于 2025-3-28 14:51:21
Chapter 7: Prospects for Agri-Food Trade Between Russia and Chinaure in the Russian Far East. Meanwhile, China is seeking to mitigate economic risks by diversifying import supply channels; Russia features as one such supplier. However, this chapter cautions that the agricultural and food trade relationship remains vulnerable to a range of operational, technical,
characteristic
发表于 2025-3-28 19:33:35
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CLEFT
发表于 2025-3-29 00:09:45
Chapter 9: Russia’s Agri-Food Trade with the Middle East and North Africa and Saudi Arabia, this chapter shows that Russia’s food trade with MENA countries is strongly affected by bilateral political relations. Russia banned most food imports from Turkey over a political conflict in 2016. In the same year, improved intergovernmental cooperation with Saudi Arabia resulted
Rotator-Cuff
发表于 2025-3-29 05:47:24
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bile648
发表于 2025-3-29 11:19:28
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隐语
发表于 2025-3-29 11:29:39
Chapter 6: Russia’s Regional Free Trade Agreements and Agri-Food Trade After 2014ments, but a series of agreements have been negotiated since 2015. The portfolio of free trade agreements is still in an early stage, but there is a clear turn to Asia in Russia’s trade. China’s role in total trade as well as in agri-food trade with Russia is considerably strengthened despite the lack of trade preferences so far.
高深莫测
发表于 2025-3-29 18:23:06
Chapter 7: Prospects for Agri-Food Trade Between Russia and Chinaand policy hurdles. These obstacles dovetail with political imperatives on both sides for self-sufficiency, which limits the scope for trade. Thus, China is and will continue to be an expanding market for Russian agricultural goods, but there are tenuous realities in terms of concrete cooperation.
迁移
发表于 2025-3-29 22:41:04
Chapter 8: Russia’s Agri-Food Trade Within the Eurasian Economic Unionto trade, including the weak common regime and its inability to constrain unilateral actions at the cost of integration. The chapter concludes that despite some recognition of the issues, fundamental changes are unlikely.