magenta
发表于 2025-3-23 13:23:22
Searlean “Is” and “Ought” Revisitedargely gone unnoticed in the current literature. The bottom line is, not unexpectedly, that the derivability of obligations from facts is to remain a matter of debate for some time still—yet a debate to which Searle’s contribution can’t be overestimated.
Generosity
发表于 2025-3-23 15:29:59
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Fantasy
发表于 2025-3-23 21:52:12
Existence as a Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle’s Viewlogy of concreteness, but this, far from removing it from the dimension of ideals and norms—even practical, ethical, and political ones—instead makes it the philosophy of ideals and relative “oughts” ..
outskirts
发表于 2025-3-24 00:36:15
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Spinal-Tap
发表于 2025-3-24 05:39:18
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flaggy
发表于 2025-3-24 09:48:05
Searle and Conte on Deriving Ought from Ise fallible. In order to argue that ought is derivable from is (and vice versa), one must use extralogical elements and, in particular, definitions. Such strategies are in fact employed by Searle and Conte.
吼叫
发表于 2025-3-24 12:02:59
Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral “Ought” from “Is”al norms can be derived and those from which they cannot should count as morally relevant. One way of avoiding this trilemma (which can be ascribed to Searle) is to interpret the possible derivation of “Ought” from “Is” as related not to ethical justification, but to the problems of social ontology.
PTCA635
发表于 2025-3-24 14:57:30
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Limpid
发表于 2025-3-24 21:03:31
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滑稽
发表于 2025-3-25 00:49:26
Is and Ought: Where Does the Problem Lie?er and directions for action with several degrees of constraint: commands, pieces of advice, suggestions, and so on. I call the latter “ductive-statements.” Thus, I affirm that the realm of morals has two branches: one relative to evaluations, which are is-sentences ranging from the several degrees