Hangar 发表于 2025-3-23 11:02:03
Is Reasoning Useful?,e everyday conditions in which we reason. Refocusing on uncertainty, preferences, and intuitions allows specialists of reasoning to tackle social concerns; and it makes research on reasoning fully interoperable with research on decisions and morality.bioavailability 发表于 2025-3-23 16:32:28
http://reply.papertrans.cn/83/8225/822470/822470_12.pngAffirm 发表于 2025-3-23 19:00:27
Decisions, consider how we use the rationality assumption (under its different guises) to predict what others will do or what they mean as well as the intuitive or deliberate nature of the reasoning processes that allow for these inferences.相信 发表于 2025-3-23 23:45:35
http://reply.papertrans.cn/83/8225/822470/822470_14.pngEncumber 发表于 2025-3-24 03:43:34
http://reply.papertrans.cn/83/8225/822470/822470_15.png眉毛 发表于 2025-3-24 07:20:44
http://reply.papertrans.cn/83/8225/822470/822470_16.png真实的你 发表于 2025-3-24 14:38:01
Decisions, the rationality assumption. The problems start, though, as soon as we try to define what we mean by “best decision.” Sometimes we mean the decision that benefit them the most. Sometimes we mean the decision that benefit others the most. And sometimes we mean something in between. In this chapter, I衍生 发表于 2025-3-24 17:01:44
Morality,moral character. Starting from the idea that inferences about moral character are first and foremost inferences about cooperative potential, we consider in turn two components of cooperative potential: other-regarding preferences and cultural competence. We explore the chains of inferences that go f装入胶囊 发表于 2025-3-24 19:34:23
Delusions,fs that respond to incentives rather than evidence) and to the kind of reasoning that sustains these delusions against contradictory evidence. We then add a layer of complexity by considering how well we reason about the motivated beliefs of others, why these inferences are important, and the researnocturia 发表于 2025-3-25 00:03:14
Democracy,st voters understand essentially nothing of the policies they vote for. It would seem natural to think that the psychology of reasoning might be helpful in that respect—that is, that we could help citizens to vote better. I argue that this is extremely unlikely to work. The second challenge is that