Anecdote 发表于 2025-3-26 23:14:45
Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory of weighted utility (or λ-transfers), we can easily generalize any solution concept for transferable-utility games to the case of games without transferable utility. Thus, from the perspective of 1990, the method of fictitious transfers appears to justify the original decision of von Neumann and Mo树木心 发表于 2025-3-27 04:27:13
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Introductionext. Some of the contributions relate to this aspect of his work. Rational interaction in the search for truth is a venerable theme within the philosophy of science. Harsanyi’s contributions to the development of a Bayesian epistemological position have also found an echo in this volume.indubitable 发表于 2025-3-28 03:08:17
The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Paymentsquite narrow; namely, the class of hyperplane games. The purpose of this paper is to extend the definition to the general class of NTU games, whose coalition functions satisfy (essentially) the usual requirements.Adenoma 发表于 2025-3-28 08:01:13
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Determinacy and Rational Choicethe theory. If that theory yields determinate solutions, in the sense that it tells each of us explicitly what to do, these solutions must be in equilibrium for rational players who have full knowledge of the payoff structure, who have this theory, and who assume that their co-players are rational and have this theory.