倾听
发表于 2025-3-25 04:02:18
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铺子
发表于 2025-3-25 10:48:40
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宣称
发表于 2025-3-25 11:42:22
Strategic Form Games on Digraphsreanu (Computer Science Journal of Moldova 6 3(18): 313–337, 1998, [.]), Ungureanu (ROMAI Journal 12(1): 133–161, 2016, [.]). Necessary and sufficient conditions for maximin solution existence in digraph matrix games with pure strategies are formulated and proved. Some particular games are considere
Inculcate
发表于 2025-3-25 17:07:30
Solution Principles for Mixtures of Simultaneous and Sequential Gameskelberg,are used to identify simply types of game models.Pareto is associated with multi-criteria decision making (Pareto, Manuel d’economie politique, Giard, Paris, 1904, [.]). Nash is associated with simultaneous games (Nash, Ann Math, 54 (2): 280–295, 1951 [.]). Stackelberg is associated with hie
迫击炮
发表于 2025-3-25 20:42:15
Computing Pareto–Nash Equilibrium Sets in Finite Multi-Objective Mixed-Strategy Gamesr. A method for a Pareto–Nash equilibrium set computing is exposed. The method is based on the fact that the set of Pareto–Nash equilibria is identified with the intersection of the graphs of efficient response mappings.
沉思的鱼
发表于 2025-3-26 00:55:45
Sets of Pareto–Nash Equilibria in Dyadic Two-Criterion Mixed-Strategy Gamesorks (Sagaidac and Ungureanu, Operational research, CEP USM, Chişinău, 296 pp, 2004 (in Romanian), [.]; Ungureanu, Comp Sci J Moldova, 14(3(42)):345–365, 2006, [.]; Ungureanu, ROMAI J, 4(1):225–242, 2008, [.]). First, problems and needed basic theoretical results are exposed. The method of intersect
朦胧
发表于 2025-3-26 06:40:21
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玉米
发表于 2025-3-26 09:37:55
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火海
发表于 2025-3-26 14:52:53
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CLOT
发表于 2025-3-26 19:41:21
Nash Equilibrium Conditions as Extensions of Some Classical Optimisation TheoremsAnalytical, theoretical and conceptual foundation for all the results of this chapter stands on domains of normal form games, both simultaneous and sequential, and on domain of optimization theory, both single-criterion and multi-criteria.