rectum 发表于 2025-3-28 17:59:30
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Antonio Rodrigues da Silva,Newton Hirata,Rodrigo Antônio Silveira dos Santos完全 发表于 2025-3-29 01:09:40
Cleber Almeida de Oliveira,Antonio Pedro Timoszczuk,Andrea Silva Hemerlyexcursion 发表于 2025-3-29 03:22:46
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nshaw et al. 2006, p. 7). At the macro-level, the most recent study on EU decision-making by Thomson et al. (2006) suggests that conventional veto player models, which stress the procedural distribution of agenda-setting and veto powers, can hardly predict outcomes and tend to underestimate the willIRATE 发表于 2025-3-29 22:44:04
ontrast, liberal intergovernmentalism argues that EU decision-making is inherently efficient, as the potential high gains from cooperation will generate a sufficient supply of efficient agreements (Moravcsik 1999). However, when we look in more detail at the actual negotiation process, we find evideBone-Scan 发表于 2025-3-30 01:31:58
Jens Bürgerontrast, liberal intergovernmentalism argues that EU decision-making is inherently efficient, as the potential high gains from cooperation will generate a sufficient supply of efficient agreements (Moravcsik 1999). However, when we look in more detail at the actual negotiation process, we find evide去才蔑视 发表于 2025-3-30 05:55:28
Jorge Calvimontes,Jens Bürgernshaw et al. 2006, p. 7). At the macro-level, the most recent study on EU decision-making by Thomson et al. (2006) suggests that conventional veto player models, which stress the procedural distribution of agenda-setting and veto powers, can hardly predict outcomes and tend to underestimate the will