长处 发表于 2025-3-23 12:06:44
Jumps and Logic in the Law,on, inter alia in statutory interpretation. A weighing and balancing of principles and other prima facie reasons is a jump. The inference is not conclusive..To deal with defeasibility and weighing, a jurist needs both the belief-revision logic and the nonmonotonic logic. The systems of nonmonotonicLargess 发表于 2025-3-23 17:42:50
http://reply.papertrans.cn/59/5882/588154/588154_12.pngHemoptysis 发表于 2025-3-23 18:44:21
http://reply.papertrans.cn/59/5882/588154/588154_13.pngLimpid 发表于 2025-3-24 00:33:28
http://image.papertrans.cn/l/image/588154.jpg眉毛 发表于 2025-3-24 04:34:38
978-94-010-6390-6Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997Mutter 发表于 2025-3-24 08:49:40
http://reply.papertrans.cn/59/5882/588154/588154_16.png不能强迫我 发表于 2025-3-24 13:49:28
A Theory of Legal Reasoning and a Logic to Match,ity and acceptance of rules, respectively principles and goals, and about the application of legal rules, and the implications of these arguments for the use of rules, principles and goals in deriving legal conclusions for concrete cases..The second part of the paper first describes a logic (Reason-庇护 发表于 2025-3-24 15:46:20
Abstract Argumentation, one way for one argument to attack another, namely by undermining one of its non-provability claims. In this paper, we show how other kinds of attack between arguments, specifically how rebuttal and priority attacks, can be reduced to the undermining of non-provability claims.Fluctuate 发表于 2025-3-24 22:58:04
Jumps and Logic in the Law,struction of the totality of legal argumentation..The lawyers’ search for reasons has no obvious end point. Ideally, the search for reasons may end when one arrives at a coherent totality of knowledge. In other words, coherence is the termination condition of reasoning. Both scientific knowledge andlibertine 发表于 2025-3-25 02:02:32
A Dialectical Model of Assessing Conflicting Arguments in Legal Reasoning,ified if the proponent can make the opponent run out of moves in whatever way the opponent attacks. Despite this dialectical form, the system reflects a ‘declarative’, or ‘relational’ approach to modelling legal argument. A basic assumption of this paper is that this approach complements two other l