GROUP 发表于 2025-3-26 23:45:42
Specializations and Generalizations of the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Gamed into two sets: a set . of . edges (inducing a spanning tree of .) with a fixed non-negative real cost, and a set . of . edges which are instead priced by a .. This is done with the final intent of . a revenue that will be returned for their purchase by a ., whose goal in turn is to select a minimulandmark 发表于 2025-3-27 02:11:42
http://reply.papertrans.cn/48/4725/472429/472429_32.pngBLUSH 发表于 2025-3-27 06:14:43
Optimal Pricing in the Presence of Local Network Effectseature of our model is that consumers experience a (positive) .. In particular, each consumer’s usage level depends directly on the usage of her . in the social network structure. Thus, the monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy may involve offering discounts to certain agents, who have a . positioncorporate 发表于 2025-3-27 11:37:40
Local Dynamics in Bargaining Networks via Random-Turn Gamesning network to optimal play in a random-turn game. We analyze this game using techniques from martingale and Markov chain theory. We obtain a tight polynomial bound on the rate of convergence for a nontrivial class of unweighted graphs (the previous known bound was exponential). Additionally, we shChagrin 发表于 2025-3-27 14:18:02
Selective Call Out and Real Time Biddinging, that is, each time the publisher contacts the exchange, the exchange “calls out” to solicit bids from ad networks. This solicitation introduces a novel aspect, in contrast to existing literature. This suggests developing a joint optimization framework which optimizes over the allocation and wel确定 发表于 2025-3-27 17:57:32
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http://reply.papertrans.cn/48/4725/472429/472429_37.pngDebate 发表于 2025-3-28 05:00:49
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http://reply.papertrans.cn/48/4725/472429/472429_39.pngNeutral-Spine 发表于 2025-3-28 11:31:53
False-Name-Proofness in Social Networkst that agents may behave strategically. An emerging phenomenon is to run such mechanisms on a social network; for example, Facebook recently allowed its users to vote on its future terms of use. One significant complication for such mechanisms is that it may be possible for a user to participate mul