招人嫉妒
发表于 2025-3-28 18:10:47
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颠簸地移动
发表于 2025-3-28 21:59:25
Ivan Damgård,Jakob Funder,Jesper Buus Nielsen,Louis Salvail
Infraction
发表于 2025-3-28 23:44:20
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缺陷
发表于 2025-3-29 03:06:06
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上下连贯
发表于 2025-3-29 11:19:19
Insider-Proof Encryption with Applications for Quantum Key Distribution,o an outside adversary when devices are used repeatedly. We show how to use the insider-proof private channel to allow DIQKD protocols to reuse devices any desired number of times without leaking information.
轻推
发表于 2025-3-29 13:14:33
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滋养
发表于 2025-3-29 16:26:57
Overcoming Weak Expectations via the R,nyi Entropy and the Expanded Computational Entropy, We achieve these results via employing the discrete form of the H.lder inequality. We also use some techniques to guarantee that the expanded computational entropy is useful in the security model. Thus our results are more general, and we also obtain some results from a computational perspective. T
HERE
发表于 2025-3-29 22:00:03
Modulus Computational Entropy,definition of the computational entropy, which we call the ., and use it as a technical tool that allows us to prove a desired chain rule that depends only on the actual leakage and not on its history. Moreover, we show that the modulus computational entropy unifies other, sometimes seemingly unrela
sclera
发表于 2025-3-30 03:24:45
Broadcast (and Round) Efficient Verifiable Secret Sharing, a refinement of the round complexity of VSS, by adding a measure we term .. We view the broadcast channel as an expensive resource and seek to minimize the number of rounds in which it is invoked as well..We construct a (linear) VSS protocol which uses the broadcast channel only . in the sharing ph
Diastole
发表于 2025-3-30 05:47:31
,Leakage Resilience of the Blom’s Key Distribution Scheme,can (1) compromise completely some nodes in a “standard” way, and (2) leak information . from the remaining nodes. The amount leakage that we can tolerate can be up to . of the total amount of information on the leaking nodes. We also show that this bound is optimal, by providing an attack that brea