CRUC
发表于 2025-3-30 08:13:37
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Indict
发表于 2025-3-30 15:10:46
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嘴唇可修剪
发表于 2025-3-30 20:06:13
Gill Garrettidders with budget constraints that extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue, for divisible and indivisible items (under a standard large market assumption). We also show a mechanism that extracts a constant fraction of the optimal liquid welfare for general valuations over divisible items.
Anthology
发表于 2025-3-31 00:26:17
t games by Drees, Feldotto, Riechers, and Skopalik (2019). We then prove that every matroid g-budget game has a PNE, which extends the result for budget games. We finally present a linear-time procedure to find a PNE in a certain class of singleton g-budget games.
同步信息
发表于 2025-3-31 01:51:59
Gill Garrettw that the equilibria of the game coincide independently from the coordination or not of the attackers. In addition, we give an algorithm for computing Nash equilibria. Our algorithm requires exponential time in the worst case, but it is polynomial-time for . constantly close to 1 or .. For the spec
Overstate
发表于 2025-3-31 05:13:14
Gill Garrettw that the equilibria of the game coincide independently from the coordination or not of the attackers. In addition, we give an algorithm for computing Nash equilibria. Our algorithm requires exponential time in the worst case, but it is polynomial-time for . constantly close to 1 or .. For the spec