JECT
发表于 2025-3-27 00:03:03
Monique Weissenberger-Leducwhen the best reply for the follower(s) is not uniquely determined. More precisely, we show, under mild assumptions in the case of one follower and sufficiently mild in the case of two followers, that a convergent sequence of solutions to regularized two-stage games generates a subgame perfect equil
管理员
发表于 2025-3-27 04:01:51
http://reply.papertrans.cn/43/4235/423499/423499_32.png
交响乐
发表于 2025-3-27 07:11:13
http://reply.papertrans.cn/43/4235/423499/423499_33.png
Pituitary-Gland
发表于 2025-3-27 12:34:28
nted in the form of a Cauchy formula analog. Using the resolving functions method, sufficient conditions for termination of the game are obtained. These conditions are based on the modified Pontryagin condition, expressed in terms of the generalized matrix functions of Mittag-Leffler. To find the la
TRUST
发表于 2025-3-27 16:26:09
Monique Weissenberger-Leduccontinuous quasi-convex payoff function . depending on two components .., .. of the phase vector .. Let . be a level set (a Lebesgue set) of the payoff function. One says that the function . possesses the level sweeping property if for any pair of constants .. < .. the relation . holds. Here, the sy
MELD
发表于 2025-3-27 19:26:53
Monique Weissenberger-Leduc the λ-discounted problem starting from .. We prove that uniform convergence (on the set of states) of the values ..( ⋅) as . tends to infinity is equivalent to uniform convergence of the values ..( ⋅) as λ tends to 0, and that the limits are identical. An example is also provided to show that the r
indigenous
发表于 2025-3-27 23:18:49
Monique Weissenberger-Leduc functions . The analog of the Pontryagin condition formulated in the paper, makes it feasible to derive sufficient conditions for the finite-time termination of differential game. Obtained results are illustrated with the typical game s
Frequency-Range
发表于 2025-3-28 03:31:35
http://reply.papertrans.cn/43/4235/423499/423499_38.png
epicardium
发表于 2025-3-28 08:42:58
Monique Weissenberger-Leducpley value operator is chosen as the cooperative optimality principle. It is shown that components of Shapley value are absolutely continuous and, thus, differentiable functions along any admissible trajectory. The main result consists in the fact that if in any subgame along the cooperative traject
Flagging
发表于 2025-3-28 12:25:59
Monique Weissenberger-Leduces of the Markov chains induced by stationary strategies satisfy a certain geometric drift condition. Under additional assumptions concerning especially the existence of .-optimal strategies in corresponding one-stage games it is shown that the average optimality equation has a solution and that bot