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The Nature of Mathematical Objects, considers the main answers that have been given to this question, specifically those according to which mathematical objects are independently existing entities, or abstractions, or logical objects, or simplifications, or mental constructions, or structures, or fictions, or idealizations of sensiblchalice 发表于 2025-3-25 12:59:45
,Countable Nonstandard Models: Following Skolem’s Approach,ruction which was introduced in model theory 20 years later. However, typical ultrapower constructions produce uncountable models. Skolem’s construction can also be connected with ideas from computability theory, formalized by Turing and others in 1936. The proof of one of Skolem’s key statements ca懒洋洋 发表于 2025-3-25 17:14:26
Mathematical Practices Can Be Metaphysically Laden,he set-theoretic pluralism debate, in which set theorists disagree about the implications of their formal mathematical work. As a first case study, I discuss how Woodin’s monist argument for an Ultimate-L feeds on and is fed by mathematical results and metaphysical beliefs. In a second case study, IMyocarditis 发表于 2025-3-25 20:22:18
Counterpossibles in Mathematical Practice: The Case of Spoof Perfect Numbers, mathematical counterfactuals seem also to be counterpossibles, in that their antecedents deny some necessary truth. In this chapter, I delineate several different categories of mathematical counterfactual (or “countermathematical”) and then examine in detail a case study from mathematical practice空中 发表于 2025-3-26 01:06:32
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William Byersmmon-law countries from the 17th to the 19th century. Its main focus (like that of Volume 9) is on the ways in which jurists and legal philosophers thought about law and legal reasoning. The volume begins with a discussion of the ‘common law mind’ as it evolved in late medieval and early modern Engl