VICT
发表于 2025-3-25 05:50:23
Optimal Insurance Contracts Under Moral Hazard,-action principal–agent problem. The insurance context provides structure that allows more specific implications for contract design. This chapter reviews the static models of optimal insurance under ex ante and ex post moral hazard as well as the implications of repeated contracting.
文字
发表于 2025-3-25 09:49:08
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BALK
发表于 2025-3-25 15:35:52
Managing Catastrophic Risks Through Redesigned Insurance: Challenges and Opportunities,agement strategies that involve private–public partnerships. These include multiyear insurance contracts with risk-based premiums coupled with mitigation loans and insurance vouchers to address affordability concerns for low-income homeowners, tax incentives, well-enforced building codes and land-use regulations.
omnibus
发表于 2025-3-25 18:00:24
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flaunt
发表于 2025-3-25 21:58:49
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使服水土
发表于 2025-3-26 02:08:05
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Disk199
发表于 2025-3-26 07:59:40
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恶名声
发表于 2025-3-26 12:18:28
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全能
发表于 2025-3-26 14:54:22
On the Demand for Corporate Insurance: Creating Value,rance. Management compensation is also introduced here and the analysis shows the conditions which motivate the corporate insurance decision. Finally, some discussion is provided concerning the empirical implications of the extant theory, the tests that have been made, and the tests that should be made going forward.
Focus-Words
发表于 2025-3-26 18:14:40
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