昏睡中
发表于 2025-3-25 04:34:53
Simultaneous Gamesespond to certain situations from everyday life and the world of business. The chapter also discusses whether the expected game outcomes are efficient from an economic point of view, i.e., whether there is potential for improvement. Finally, it is shown how an equilibrium can also be calculated for continuous strategies.
minimal
发表于 2025-3-25 10:42:31
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athlete’s-foot
发表于 2025-3-25 12:42:50
Sprechwissenschaft & Psycholinguistik 5quence of moves can lead to different advantages for the players. Players may thus have an incentive to influence the outcome of the game to their advantage—but this is often only possible if they can credibly commit themselves and empty threats are excluded. The analysis concludes with a consideration of sequential games in continuous strategies.
失望昨天
发表于 2025-3-25 19:51:43
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Communal
发表于 2025-3-25 22:11:56
Paula Irik,Irene Maijer-Kruijssena distinction must be made here between a finite and an infinite number of repetitions. In the latter case, the strategy space expands considerably, so that almost any game outcome can be achieved through a suitable choice of strategy and thus problematic game outcomes can be overcome.
中古
发表于 2025-3-26 02:42:21
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habile
发表于 2025-3-26 04:43:21
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-94350-7 uncertainty) or known (risk). The various decision rules are illustrated and critically discussed using an example. Subsequently, the applicability of these rules is examined if the outcome does not depend on chance but on the decision of another decision-maker, i.e., if there is a strategic interaction as analyzed in game theory.
考古学
发表于 2025-3-26 10:35:25
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一窝小鸟
发表于 2025-3-26 12:48:09
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协定
发表于 2025-3-26 20:12:50
Marten Deinum,Daniel Rubio,Josh Longvertising), strategic incentives for investment (e.g. R&D and technical standards), incentive mechanisms for compensation as well as implications of market regulation (e.g. lobbying and anti-competitive behavior such as cartels).