BAN
发表于 2025-3-26 21:36:56
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陪审团每个人
发表于 2025-3-27 03:19:50
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Repetitions
发表于 2025-3-27 08:21:52
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Antecedent
发表于 2025-3-27 10:49:02
Bargaining in Networks with Socially-Aware Agentsese new stability notions admit intuitive interpretations touching on . agents. Overall, our contributions are meant to identify natural and desirable bargaining outcomes as well as to characterize powerful positions in bargaining networks.
Missile
发表于 2025-3-27 14:42:10
Conference proceedings 2019nce, in April 2019.. The 8 full and 3 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 17 submissions. They are organized in the following topical sections: Game Theory for Wireless Networks; Games for Economy and Resource Allocation; and Game Theory for Social Networks..
恶臭
发表于 2025-3-27 21:13:44
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拔出
发表于 2025-3-27 23:10:53
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大炮
发表于 2025-3-28 04:15:30
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-12196-2traints. We have succeeded in showing that the utilities satisfy the property of diagonal strict concavity (DSC), which can be viewed as an extension of concavity to a game setting. It not only guarantees the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium but also of the normalized equilibrium.
含糊其辞
发表于 2025-3-28 07:33:51
Two-Level Cooperation in Network Games allocate the value in two steps using the Shapley value and show the difference with the classical one-step allocation procedure. We then adopt this approach for games with pairwise interactions and provide relations between several definitions of the characteristic function and the corresponding Shapley values.
Oafishness
发表于 2025-3-28 14:28:55
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