BULK
发表于 2025-3-21 18:59:23
书目名称Game Theory for Networks影响因子(影响力)<br> http://figure.impactfactor.cn/if/?ISSN=BK0380504<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Game Theory for Networks影响因子(影响力)学科排名<br> http://figure.impactfactor.cn/ifr/?ISSN=BK0380504<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Game Theory for Networks网络公开度<br> http://figure.impactfactor.cn/at/?ISSN=BK0380504<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Game Theory for Networks网络公开度学科排名<br> http://figure.impactfactor.cn/atr/?ISSN=BK0380504<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Game Theory for Networks被引频次<br> http://figure.impactfactor.cn/tc/?ISSN=BK0380504<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Game Theory for Networks被引频次学科排名<br> http://figure.impactfactor.cn/tcr/?ISSN=BK0380504<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Game Theory for Networks年度引用<br> http://figure.impactfactor.cn/ii/?ISSN=BK0380504<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Game Theory for Networks年度引用学科排名<br> http://figure.impactfactor.cn/iir/?ISSN=BK0380504<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Game Theory for Networks读者反馈<br> http://figure.impactfactor.cn/5y/?ISSN=BK0380504<br><br> <br><br>书目名称Game Theory for Networks读者反馈学科排名<br> http://figure.impactfactor.cn/5yr/?ISSN=BK0380504<br><br> <br><br>
夜晚
发表于 2025-3-21 21:22:50
A Multitype Hawk and Dove Gamean decide whether to act aggressively (Hawk) or peacefully (Dove). Each individual is characterized by its strength. The strength distribution among the population is assumed to be fixed and not to vary in time. If both individuals involved in an interaction are Hawks, there will be a fight, the res
爱管闲事
发表于 2025-3-22 04:19:55
Assortative Mixing Equilibria in Social Network Gamesof their own kind. But what are the reasons for this phenomenon? Is it that such relations are more convenient and easier to maintain? Or are there also some more tangible benefits to be gained from this collective behaviour?.The current work takes a game-theoretic perspective on this phenomenon, an
exceptional
发表于 2025-3-22 05:40:20
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Incorporate
发表于 2025-3-22 10:31:40
On the Finite Population Evolutionary Stable Strategy Equilibrium for Perfect Information Extensive form games. In this adaptation, players reach a finite population evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium by using finite population evolutionary stable strategies which ensure that the game ends up with equal payoffs. We studied the fpESS equilibria of some famous two-player bargaining games such
opalescence
发表于 2025-3-22 15:31:01
Designing Cyber Insurance Policies: Mitigating Moral Hazard Through Security Pre-Screeningity. However, in the absence of regulated insurance markets or compulsory insurance, the introduction of insurance deteriorates network security. This is because by transferring part of their risk to the insurer, the insured agents can decrease their levels of effort. In this paper, we consider the
opalescence
发表于 2025-3-22 17:17:19
A Game-Theoretic Model for Analysis and Design of Self-organization Mechanisms in IoTti-interface nodes are modeled as self-interested agents who individually decide on establishment and severance of links to other agents. Through analysis of the static game, we formally confirm the emergence of realistic topologies from our model, and analytically establish the criteria that lead t
Ardent
发表于 2025-3-22 23:15:19
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Demulcent
发表于 2025-3-23 05:17:32
Rules for Computing Resistance of Transitions of Learning Algorithms in Gamesal games, the SSSs of the log-linear learning algorithm are the minimizers of the potential function. The SSSs can be characterized using the resistance trees of a Perturbed Markov Chain (PMC), they are the roots of minimum resistance tree. Therefore, computing the resistance of trees in PMC is impo
dictator
发表于 2025-3-23 07:36:58
Optimal Control of Multi-strain Epidemic Processes in Complex Networksress. Despite the rapid development of vaccines and drugs, one challenge in disease control is the fact that one pathogen sometimes generates many strains with different spreading features. Hence it is of critical importance to investigate multi-strain epidemic dynamics and its associated epidemic c