preservative
发表于 2025-3-28 15:10:01
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殖民地
发表于 2025-3-28 22:03:52
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祝贺
发表于 2025-3-29 02:01:20
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ANNUL
发表于 2025-3-29 07:02:45
Convergence Dynamics of Graphical Congestion Games,g when graphical congestion game dynamics converge to pure Nash equilibria yields important engineering insights into when spatially distributed individuals can reach a stable resource allocation. In this paper, we study the convergence dynamics of graphical congestion games where players can use mu
Forsake
发表于 2025-3-29 07:14:43
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狂热文化
发表于 2025-3-29 14:40:25
Efficiency Loss in a Cournot Oligopoly with Convex Market Demand,t a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, for the case where the inverse market demand function is convex. We establish a lower bound on the efficiency of Cournot equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter derived from the inverse demand function. Our results provide nontrivial quantitative bo
intricacy
发表于 2025-3-29 17:59:16
A Game Theoretic Optimization of the Multi-channel ALOHA Protocol,-channel ALOHA protocol, each user tries to randomly access a channel using a probability vector defining the access probability to the various channels. First, we characterize the Nash Equilibrium Points (NEPs) of the network when users solve the unconstrained rate maximization. We show that in thi
subordinate
发表于 2025-3-29 23:43:07
Game-theoretic Robustness of Many-to-one Networks, a game-theoretic model. More specifically, we model the interactions between a network operator and an adversary as a two player zero-sum game, where the network operator chooses a spanning tree in the network, the adversary chooses an edge to be removed from the network, and the adversary’s payoff
人类学家
发表于 2025-3-30 03:03:38
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Fibrinogen
发表于 2025-3-30 06:28:20
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