ALIBI 发表于 2025-3-25 04:18:07
http://reply.papertrans.cn/39/3805/380490/380490_21.png咆哮 发表于 2025-3-25 08:32:59
http://reply.papertrans.cn/39/3805/380490/380490_22.pngEpidural-Space 发表于 2025-3-25 13:03:00
http://reply.papertrans.cn/39/3805/380490/380490_23.pngLeisureliness 发表于 2025-3-25 19:05:27
http://reply.papertrans.cn/39/3805/380490/380490_24.pngCulmination 发表于 2025-3-25 21:34:22
Solutions Based on Characteristic Functionser, and receive the corresponding payoffs. The Nash equilibrium does not need agreement between the players, since at an equilibrium situation the interest of each player is to keep the equilibrium strategy, otherwise his payoff decreases. Each player considers his own selfish interest without any c容易懂得 发表于 2025-3-26 01:18:07
Conflict Resolutioned among the players. There are, however, many cases when this is impossible. First, if the payoffs of the different players are not transferable, second, if the players are unable to agree on the mechanism of side payments. In this chapter, solution concepts are introduced in which each player earnpulmonary-edema 发表于 2025-3-26 04:55:38
http://reply.papertrans.cn/39/3805/380490/380490_27.pnginterrogate 发表于 2025-3-26 10:10:09
Social Choicen considering environmental issues like esthetics. In such cases no numerical payoff functions are given, only the rankings of the alternatives are possible. Then social choice concepts provide solutions.奇思怪想 发表于 2025-3-26 15:50:53
http://reply.papertrans.cn/39/3805/380490/380490_29.pngCHART 发表于 2025-3-26 17:09:13
Akio Matsumoto,Ferenc SzidarovszkyPresents serious theoretical development in an easy-to-follow style.Provides computer methodology to solve a broad class of problems.Includes a wide range of applications in many different areas.Inclu