纬度 发表于 2025-3-26 22:32:20

http://reply.papertrans.cn/39/3805/380481/380481_31.png

凹处 发表于 2025-3-27 04:27:07

http://reply.papertrans.cn/39/3805/380481/380481_32.png

提炼 发表于 2025-3-27 09:10:19

http://reply.papertrans.cn/39/3805/380481/380481_33.png

是限制 发表于 2025-3-27 11:42:38

http://reply.papertrans.cn/39/3805/380481/380481_34.png

极肥胖 发表于 2025-3-27 15:52:04

http://reply.papertrans.cn/39/3805/380481/380481_35.png

braggadocio 发表于 2025-3-27 21:35:30

Epistemic Game Theory: Incomplete Information,teraction. The private information of a player may be about the payoff functions in the game, as well as about some exogenous, payoff-irrelevant events. The player may also form beliefs about other players’ beliefs about payoffs and exogenous events, about their beliefs about the beliefs of others, and so forth.

灵敏 发表于 2025-3-27 23:04:28

http://reply.papertrans.cn/39/3805/380481/380481_37.png

伸展 发表于 2025-3-28 05:51:45

Learning and Evolution in Games: An Overview, and when disequilibrium behaviour will resolve in equilibrium play, and, if it does, on predicting which equilibrium will be played. But the theory also offers techniques for characterizing perpetual disequilibrium play.

的’ 发表于 2025-3-28 08:32:22

Biogeographische Regionen der Erde, preference relation) over possible payoff-relevant outcomes while his cognitive limitations are described as incomplete information. Thus, the standard economic theory of the individual is couched in the language of constrained maximization and statistical inference.

hematuria 发表于 2025-3-28 14:16:17

http://reply.papertrans.cn/39/3805/380481/380481_40.png
页: 1 2 3 [4] 5 6 7
查看完整版本: Titlebook: Game Theory; Steven N. Durlauf,Lawrence E. Blume Book 2010 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2010 Area.field.