JUST 发表于 2025-3-23 11:06:38
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Exkurs: Das Rechnungswesen der Unternehmunguzzy sets (IFSs), which are called IFS bi-matrix games for short. In this method, using the equivalent relation between IFSs and interval-valued fuzzy sets (IVFSs) and the operations of IVFSs, we propose a new order relation of IFSs through introducing a ranking function, which is proven to be a tot闲聊 发表于 2025-3-24 02:45:46
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0657-4artificial intelligence; autonomous agents; coalition formations; coalitional game; cooperative game; fuzPATHY 发表于 2025-3-24 09:49:38
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Game Theory978-981-15-0657-4Series ISSN 1865-0929 Series E-ISSN 1865-0937是剥皮 发表于 2025-3-24 16:07:39
The Consensus Games for Consensus Economics Under the Framework of Blockchain in Fintech, the consensus incentives from Bitcoin ecosystems in financial technology (Fintech), we then establish the general existence results for consensus equilibria of consensus games in terms of corresponding interpretation based on the viewpoint of Blockchain consensus in Fintech by applying the conceptSTEER 发表于 2025-3-24 20:44:33
Characterizations of the Position Value for Hypergraph Communication Situations,e uniform hyperlink game or the .-augmented uniform hyperlink game, which are obtained from a given hypergraph communication situation. These results generalize the non-axiomatic characterization of the position value from communication situations in Kongo (.) (Int J Game Theory (2010) 39: 669–675)外表读作 发表于 2025-3-24 23:47:04
A Class of Social-Shapley Values of Cooperative Games with Graph Structure,rianism of the Shapley value and the egalitarianism of the Solidarity value, in which the sociality is reflected by the Solidarity value. Through defining the corresponding properties in graph-restricted games, the paper axiomatically characterizes the Social-Shapley value when the coefficient is gi