Coolidge
发表于 2025-3-21 16:42:47
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高度赞扬
发表于 2025-3-21 22:09:45
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hermetic
发表于 2025-3-22 03:53:57
Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gaased services in various sectors such as health care, education, and transportation. As has been pointed out by Hart (2003), a key property of a public-private partnership is the fact that facility construction and subsequent service provision are bundled and assigned to a single private-sector enti
嘲笑
发表于 2025-3-22 06:32:14
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Struction structure is exogenously given, more recently a relatively small literature has emerged in which the agent is not privately informed from the outset, but has the ability to acquire private information; i.e., the information structure is endogenous.
boisterous
发表于 2025-3-22 12:37:42
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidenceufficient incentives to make non-contractible investments if it fears that it will be held up by its partner in the future. This hold-up problem is an important ingredient of the incomplete contracting approach, which has become a leading paradigm in institutional and organizational economics.
阻挡
发表于 2025-3-22 16:33:57
Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidencetions in which two different tasks to be delegated may be in direct conflict with each other; i.e., providing effort in one task may have a negative side effect on the success probability of the other task. In such situations, job design becomes a major issue.
阻挡
发表于 2025-3-22 19:15:54
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小步舞
发表于 2025-3-23 00:05:03
Arkendu Sen,Lakshmi Selvaratnamthe design of selling and procurement mechanisms, the provision of investment incentives in trading relationships, the design of wage schemes, and the assignment of different tasks within firms, have all been fruitfully studied from a contract-theoretic perspective.
Diskectomy
发表于 2025-3-23 01:24:10
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似少年
发表于 2025-3-23 09:37:31
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