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Games in Support Function Form: An Approach to the Kernel of NTU Games,e kernel for TU games was introduced by Davis and Maschler and its mathematical structure was further developed by Maschler and Peleg , . The kernel is a subset of the bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley , .Calibrate 发表于 2025-3-24 15:09:19
On Prize Games,e coalition to another. H-games have turned out in various approaches to the value of general non-transferable utility (NTU) games. In this paper we introduce a simple model — . — that generates the hyperplane games. Next, we provide an axiomatization for the Maschler & Owen consistent value of H-games.一大群 发表于 2025-3-24 23:02:52
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Consistent Demands for Coalition Formation,on in a coalition. These demands have several appealing features. We characterize the sets of semi-stable and stable demand vectors for general NTU games using consistency requirements that relate the demands formed in the initial game to demands formed by subgroups considering their outside options.