失望未来
发表于 2025-3-30 09:23:03
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JUST
发表于 2025-3-30 13:02:45
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39959-6urve, for use as a benchmark to establish a takeover bid. This paper tackles the problem by means of a non-cooperative approach. The proposed model also makes it possible to consider takeover and portfolio theories from a single viewpoint.
希望
发表于 2025-3-30 16:35:51
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心胸狭窄
发表于 2025-3-30 22:27:51
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Herbivorous
发表于 2025-3-31 01:58:58
The ,-Value for Cost Sharing in Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Situationstree (mcst) situations. The .-value is related to the Kruskal algorithm for finding an mcst. Moreover, the .-value leads to a core allocation of the corresponding mcst game, and when applied also to the mcst subsituations it delivers a population monotonic allocation scheme. A cone-wise positive lin
modish
发表于 2025-3-31 05:42:23
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运动性
发表于 2025-3-31 11:18:01
Monotonicity of Power and Power Measuresualifies an index as a valid yardstick for measuring power. This paper questions if such claims are really warranted. In the light of features of real-world collective decision making such as coalition formation processes, ideological affinities, a priori unions, and strategic interaction, standard
SHRIK
发表于 2025-3-31 13:25:30
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我要威胁
发表于 2025-3-31 19:21:11
“Counting” Power Indices for Games with a Priori Unions those computed by counting appropriately weighted contributions of players to winning coalitions — to simple games with a priori unions. This class contains most well-known indices, including Banzhaf, Johnston, Holler and Deegan—Packel indices. The Shapley—Shubik index for simple games with a prior
多产鱼
发表于 2025-3-31 22:31:10
The Dynamic Stability of Coalitionist Behaviour for Two-Strategy Bimatrix Gamesames. In the proposed approach non-coalitionists play either Nash strategies or choose one of two pure strategies. In the first case it is proved that non-coalitionists are asymptotically eliminated. In the second case coalitionists can propagate without eliminating all non-coalitionists.