他很灵活 发表于 2025-3-23 13:19:31
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Stirnstreuung der Synchronmaschine,bjects; namely, that the decisions are non-independent. These problems are common to experimental economists. For example, with respect to repeated measurement Roth argues in . that “not only autocorrelation, but also potential learning effects (diminishing variance by periods) raise questions thatDappled 发表于 2025-3-23 22:39:22
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-2373-7ons have only a negligible influence on each other. This is certainly an extreme description of the world. At the other extreme one might model social life as a sequence of two person games in which both players know each other very well and were each individual’s well-being depends to a large exten薄荷醇 发表于 2025-3-24 08:12:12
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-40446-1It is a stylized fact of many experiments on the ultimatum game and alternating offer bargaining games that play deviates from the game theoretic solution toward equitable allocations. Evidence for this result are the surveys by Güth and Tietz (1990) and Thaler (1988) as well as the more recent ones by Roth (1995) and Camerer and Thaler (1995).CANE 发表于 2025-3-24 18:02:41
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An Overview,The book comprises five essays, each of which is self-contained. I will shortly describe the content of each chapter and discuss their relations.充满装饰 发表于 2025-3-25 00:06:56
Profit Sharing in an Asymmetric Bargaining Game,It is a stylized fact of many experiments on the ultimatum game and alternating offer bargaining games that play deviates from the game theoretic solution toward equitable allocations. Evidence for this result are the surveys by Güth and Tietz (1990) and Thaler (1988) as well as the more recent ones by Roth (1995) and Camerer and Thaler (1995).