heterogeneous
发表于 2025-3-28 17:55:53
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不利
发表于 2025-3-28 20:17:28
Daizhan Cheng,Hongsheng Qi,Zhiqiang Li any game the strategies that might be chosen by rational and intelligent players who know the structure of the game, and who recognize each other’s rationality and knowledge. The problem was not to find the set of strategies that satisfied some independent characterization of rationality and intell
服从
发表于 2025-3-29 00:08:09
Series and Integral Representations,owing an equally well-received (albeit questionable) view, a known event must be true. Hence the standard definition of . (CK), as perhaps first introduced by Lewis (1969) and as formalized in Aumann’s (1976) classic paper: an event is said to be CK if it is true, every individual in the group knows it, etc.
淡紫色花
发表于 2025-3-29 03:49:30
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独裁政府
发表于 2025-3-29 07:55:53
On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledgeowing an equally well-received (albeit questionable) view, a known event must be true. Hence the standard definition of . (CK), as perhaps first introduced by Lewis (1969) and as formalized in Aumann’s (1976) classic paper: an event is said to be CK if it is true, every individual in the group knows it, etc.
Forsake
发表于 2025-3-29 12:25:54
Synchronic Information, Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games is her turn to move, etc. It is not, however, a sufficiently rich language in the sense that there are meaningful and natural statements that one can make (about a given extensive game) whose truth cannot be decided without making the language richer. We shall give two examples. Consider first the extensive form of Figure 1.
interference
发表于 2025-3-29 16:45:40
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落叶剂
发表于 2025-3-29 21:07:20
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-1139-3agents; bounded rationality; decision theory; economics; game theory; knowledge; reason
榨取
发表于 2025-3-30 02:50:23
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ENDOW
发表于 2025-3-30 06:31:51
Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions978-1-4613-1139-3Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044