canonical 发表于 2025-3-25 06:11:34
http://reply.papertrans.cn/31/3029/302840/302840_21.png数量 发表于 2025-3-25 10:25:55
http://reply.papertrans.cn/31/3029/302840/302840_22.pngepidermis 发表于 2025-3-25 15:02:23
http://reply.papertrans.cn/31/3029/302840/302840_23.png刻苦读书 发表于 2025-3-25 19:53:43
978-94-010-5525-3Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1991无畏 发表于 2025-3-25 21:55:56
http://reply.papertrans.cn/31/3029/302840/302840_25.pnggruelling 发表于 2025-3-26 00:31:07
http://reply.papertrans.cn/31/3029/302840/302840_26.png小步走路 发表于 2025-3-26 06:25:23
http://reply.papertrans.cn/31/3029/302840/302840_27.pngEthics 发表于 2025-3-26 08:57:52
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50859-2 this, we had to find a game form such that at each profile, the set of strong Nash equilibria of the resulting game coincided with the values of the social choice correspondence at this profile. The particular game form solving this problem was usually of minor interest; its main role was to establInculcate 发表于 2025-3-26 12:40:37
,Das stationäre elektrische Strömungsfeld,One might get the impression that this is the only interesting cooperative solution. This is wrong, however. For all its merits, the strong Nash equilibrium cannot be considered as the only way of formulating a cooperative solution.令人作呕 发表于 2025-3-26 18:53:47
,Das stationäre elektrische Feld,ivity functions associated with a social choice correspondence or with a game form (together with a comment on a further one, the so-called first efFectivity function .* associated with a social choice function). One can easily get the impression that the α- and β-construction are the only ones of i