窝转脊椎动物
发表于 2025-3-25 06:06:39
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放牧
发表于 2025-3-25 10:26:50
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-8261-2s created by framing effects, a separate study was conducted. 200 students were given a case describing city planning options in a small Norwegian city. They formed panels of maximum three persons each. They were expected to act as concerned citizens and try and build consistent multi criteria utili
misanthrope
发表于 2025-3-25 13:03:37
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-7382-5ventional decision tree diagrams are not well suited to represent such continuously distributed temporal uncertainties. As a modeling aid for such problems, Hazen (1992) introduced the ., a diagram which combines features of decision trees and stochastic-process transition diagrams. Stochastic tree
脱离
发表于 2025-3-25 17:55:30
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dragon
发表于 2025-3-25 22:11:30
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306790identical transformation of all values of the bidders into bids. (In a common value auction the problem of allocative efficiency disappears.) The pricing rule has to be an additively separable function of the bids.Under the condition that a pricing rule is efficient, monotone, and reciprocitive (a b
放逐
发表于 2025-3-26 01:53:45
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Assemble
发表于 2025-3-26 06:24:33
Beyond the New Economic Anthropologying is not constant even if the flexibility of preference is constant. The main result of this model is that more frequent demand fluctuations are brought about by increase in wealth or income. Our model uses the stochastic dynamic programming method combined with expected utility theory. It is also
憎恶
发表于 2025-3-26 11:48:48
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过份好问
发表于 2025-3-26 15:41:28
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HUMID
发表于 2025-3-26 19:48:10
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25545-0Emission permit markets are often thin. The conditions for emission permit markets to yield efficient outcomes are therefore not automatically satisfied. This paper shows — using a principal-agent framework — how the regulatory agency (the principal) can induce price-taking behavior by the firms (the agents) in emission permit markets.