paragon 发表于 2025-3-28 17:42:22

Communication of Private Information in Capital Markets: ,r news always design contracts to “separate” themselves from agents with worse news, or whether there are conditions under which they choose to “pool.” The answer to this question has significant implications for the value of verified reports.

凝结剂 发表于 2025-3-28 20:37:52

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overweight 发表于 2025-3-29 00:27:29

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ALIAS 发表于 2025-3-29 06:52:12

Managerial Compensation: ,composition of top executive compensation packages is different from that of workers in other occupations. Particularly notable is the recent trend toward paying a substantial portion of the total compensation in the form of incentive plans, such as annual bonus, long-term performance reward, stock

咆哮 发表于 2025-3-29 07:55:50

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舞蹈编排 发表于 2025-3-29 14:17:19

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Bernstein-test 发表于 2025-3-29 16:10:59

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珊瑚 发表于 2025-3-29 20:31:59

e put this volume together. The research papers in the volume are in three sections: information evaluation in multi person conte)l:ts; contracting in agencies under moral hazard; and contracting in agencies with private information. We begin part I with Jerry Feltham‘s review of John Butterworth‘s pioneering978-94-010-7702-6978-94-009-2667-7

Nucleate 发表于 2025-3-30 02:47:23

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vector 发表于 2025-3-30 07:36:51

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查看完整版本: Titlebook: Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts; Essays in Honor of J Gerald A. Feltham,Amin H. Amershi,William T. Ziemb Book 1988 Kluwer Ac