Permanent
发表于 2025-3-27 00:15:10
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frugal
发表于 2025-3-27 03:18:28
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prodrome
发表于 2025-3-27 07:24:16
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Arresting
发表于 2025-3-27 11:03:51
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4 supplier strives to maximize its profit..We show that in both cases some Nash equilibrium exists. Nevertheless a close analysis of the equilibrium for profit maximization shows that it is not realistic. This raises the difficulty to predict the behavior of a market where the suppliers are known to be mainly interested by profit maximization.
Diatribe
发表于 2025-3-27 17:25:08
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哪有黄油
发表于 2025-3-27 19:47:47
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喃喃诉苦
发表于 2025-3-27 22:29:16
Cooperative Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information,ge class of games where these conditions cannot be satisfied the regularization procedure is developed and new characteristic function is constructed. The “regularized” core is defined and strongly time-consistency proved. The Special case of stochastic games is also investigated in details.
deceive
发表于 2025-3-28 02:37:08
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变色龙
发表于 2025-3-28 06:46:24
Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game,leading tax announcements to steer the economy to an equilibrium that is Pareto superior to the solutions usually suggested in the literature. Depending upon the initial proportion of Believers, the Regulator may prefer a fast or a low speed of reaction of the firms to differences in Believers/Non-Believers profits.
inspiration
发表于 2025-3-28 12:25:13
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