绝缘
发表于 2025-3-25 05:45:25
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-7981-6ction reduction steps such a point will most probably have a reduced objective function value. We present an exploratory experimental result that illustrates the behavior of LinSup on an infeasible LP problem.
jet-lag
发表于 2025-3-25 11:13:59
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不满分子
发表于 2025-3-25 12:54:20
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04142-5e clusters is given as an input. It is shown that the problem is strongly NP-hard. A 2-approximation algorithm which runs in polynomial time for a fixed number of clusters is proposed for this problem.
不确定
发表于 2025-3-25 19:44:04
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CHIDE
发表于 2025-3-25 23:34:34
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雀斑
发表于 2025-3-26 02:55:27
An Approximation Algorithm for a Problem of Partitioning a Sequence into Clusters with Restrictions e clusters is given as an input. It is shown that the problem is strongly NP-hard. A 2-approximation algorithm which runs in polynomial time for a fixed number of clusters is proposed for this problem.
Bmd955
发表于 2025-3-26 06:31:52
Thermodynamic Properties of Micellar Systemss the waiting time for the service. Finally, the social costs under the equilibrium and under the optimal distribution are compared. It is shown that the price of anarchy can be infinitely large in the model with strategic pricing.
aggravate
发表于 2025-3-26 10:37:05
Recovery of Oil Using Surfactant-Based FoamsCSR 2013). Finally, refining a geometric algorithm due to Servakh (Diskretn. Anal. Issled. Oper. 7(1):75–82), we show that the more general . problem is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the partial order width combined with the maximum allowed difference between the earliest possible and factual starting time of a job.
GEN
发表于 2025-3-26 12:45:28
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无能力
发表于 2025-3-26 18:40:23
Wardrop Equilibrium for Networks with the BPR Latency Functions the waiting time for the service. Finally, the social costs under the equilibrium and under the optimal distribution are compared. It is shown that the price of anarchy can be infinitely large in the model with strategic pricing.