不公开
发表于 2025-3-28 16:35:03
Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core balanced. In this framework, an incentive compatible core concept is defined for NTU games derived from economies with asymmetric information. The main result is nonemptiness of the incentive compatible core.
defuse
发表于 2025-3-28 21:45:08
Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric informationies without subjective probabilities. Differences in the interpretation of measurability assumptions between these two models are discussed, and another model with information consistent utility functions is developed in which the result would also hold.
trigger
发表于 2025-3-29 02:23:40
Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential informationtions coincides with the “private core” (Yannelis, 1991). We also show that the “weak fine core” of an economy coincides with the set of competitive allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which the traders information is the joint information of all the traders in the original economy.
准则
发表于 2025-3-29 06:47:33
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许可
发表于 2025-3-29 09:45:33
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性上瘾
发表于 2025-3-29 14:24:35
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Firefly
发表于 2025-3-29 18:21:09
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finale
发表于 2025-3-29 20:51:18
Marc Antoine Campill,Enno von Fircksication technology is stochastic, we show that transfers and monitoring probabilities are decreasing functions of wealth. The key economic problem in this environment is that optimal contracts are .. We are able to resolve this interdependency problem by using abstract measure theoretic tools.
吞没
发表于 2025-3-30 00:10:49
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构想
发表于 2025-3-30 06:38:05
Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies,erative and noncooperative concepts, and also we discuss briefly the possible implementation of these concepts as perfect Bayesian equilibria through the construction of relevant game trees. This possibility is related to whether the allocation is incentive compatible. This depends on whether there is free disposal or not.