滑动
发表于 2025-3-23 12:37:38
Deeksha Kaul,Harika Raju,B. K. Tripathy assets. Careful strategic placement of honeypots in networks should consider not only network aspects but also attackers’ preferences. The allocation of honeypots in tactical networks under network mobility is of great interest. To achieve this objective, we present a game-theoretic approach that g
Affectation
发表于 2025-3-23 14:38:35
Deeksha Kaul,Harika Raju,B. K. Tripathystem using a formal security model: a probabilistic attack graph. By allocating fake targets/decoys, the defender aims to distract the attacker from compromising true targets. By increasing the cost of some attack actions, the defender aims to discourage the attacker from committing to certain polic
Fortuitous
发表于 2025-3-23 18:49:15
http://reply.papertrans.cn/27/2644/264321/264321_13.png
Vasodilation
发表于 2025-3-24 00:32:58
http://reply.papertrans.cn/27/2644/264321/264321_14.png
身心疲惫
发表于 2025-3-24 05:36:46
http://reply.papertrans.cn/27/2644/264321/264321_15.png
乐意
发表于 2025-3-24 07:31:43
http://reply.papertrans.cn/27/2644/264321/264321_16.png
chisel
发表于 2025-3-24 10:49:13
978-3-031-50669-7The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl
Macronutrients
发表于 2025-3-24 15:52:31
Decision and Game Theory for Security978-3-031-50670-3Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349
Enthralling
发表于 2025-3-24 19:04:05
Observable Perfect Equilibriumle action probabilities (not necessarily over all action probabilities that may not be observable by opposing players). Observable perfect equilibrium correctly captures the assumption that the opponent is playing as rationally as possible given mistakes that have been observed (while previous solut
六个才偏离
发表于 2025-3-25 02:24:02
Does Cyber-Insurance Benefit the Insured or the Attacker? – A Game of Cyber-Insurancevestment and increases the attacker’s expected payoffs. Therefore, the attacker has a motive to manipulate cyber-insurance by selective cyber-attacks on organizations up to a critical point, beyond which we discovered that imposing further threat will force organizations to invest more in cybersecur