法官 发表于 2025-3-25 05:02:53
Conference proceedings 1991October 1989. It coincided with the annual meeting of the italian group on Game Theory; the group is formed by economists, mathematicians, engineers and social scientists. One of the targets of the Meeting, and therefore of the book, is to create an opportunity for having together papers by scientis团结 发表于 2025-3-25 07:31:46
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David B. Zilberman,A. M. Piatigorsky’s strategies are unknown. However, each player is assumed to know with certainty that the true game lies within a known, bounded class of games. Optimal and beneficial solutions to the uncertain Lyapunov games are derived, and their basic properties are investigated.Limpid 发表于 2025-3-25 19:12:21
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Communication Games,ve games with coalitional structures as established by Aumann and Drèze (1974), a unique allocation rule which is both efficient and fair can be derived and shown to be essentially given by the Shapley value of a restricted game. Furthermore, it turns out that if the game is superadditive, then the痛苦一生 发表于 2025-3-26 05:42:57
0075-8442 een the monetary policy maker (go vernment) and the responding agent (private sector). Because of asymmetry in the (stochastic) information available the Nash 978-3-540-53592-8978-3-642-45686-2Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957Bother 发表于 2025-3-26 11:43:43
Conference proceedings 1991ferential games are treated in the papers by Basar, Haurie -and Deissemberg. Basar considers a stochastic model of a conflict situation between the monetary policy maker (go vernment) and the responding agent (private sector). Because of asymmetry in the (stochastic) information available the Nash中和 发表于 2025-3-26 16:09:31
http://reply.papertrans.cn/27/2643/264263/264263_29.png健谈的人 发表于 2025-3-26 17:52:42
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