corporate
发表于 2025-3-25 05:04:34
The Case-In-Chief: What the Law Does (Not) Say,manages these strategic civilian and military elites—the Constitution, statutes, case law, regulations, or military doctrine—neatly dictates the parameters or even the norms of these relationships. This chapter surveys the primary sources of legal and bureaucratic authority for these parties, rangin
fledged
发表于 2025-3-25 10:36:58
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BLANC
发表于 2025-3-25 13:28:10
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DUST
发表于 2025-3-25 18:09:33
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faultfinder
发表于 2025-3-26 00:02:24
Exhibit A: Scope of Responsibility and Authority,esponsibility or “freedom of maneuver.” He relies on several historical vignettes to demonstrate the varying lengths by which civilian principles “leashed” their senior military officers. This chapter looks first to Jefferson Davis’s overbearing relationship with his generals, including Braxton Brag
Commonplace
发表于 2025-3-26 00:26:09
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Cardiac-Output
发表于 2025-3-26 07:41:28
Exhibit B: When Fidelity and Frankness Conflict,l security or in legal practice—often work at cross-purposes, undermining the principal–agent relationship between strategic civil-military leader. Maurer summarizes two famous cases where fidelity to one’s principal (and vice versa) seemed to cramp the parallel duty of candor. Both the “Revolt of t
insolence
发表于 2025-3-26 10:12:50
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Chagrin
发表于 2025-3-26 15:25:22
Closing Argument,ized miscalculation. With the nature of this relationship fundamentally a principal–agent dynamic, and with “fingerprints” left by senior strategic civil and military leaders as evidence of that fact, Maurer concludes that common fiduciary duties of candor, loyalty, confidentiality, and scope of res
indignant
发表于 2025-3-26 19:29:44
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