随意 发表于 2025-3-28 17:38:52
between banks and third-party creditors: No creditor knows when and under what conditions the other creditor will appropriate funds from the debtor company’s asset pool. This coordination problem is traditional978-3-319-87218-6978-3-319-62036-7Innovative 发表于 2025-3-28 19:54:01
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Covenants and Bilateral Creditor Protectionll illustrate the debtor company’s obligations and, with it, the bank’s rights and potential for influencing the debtor company. First, the common covenants will be presented according to their ability to reduce the three credit risks. Afterwards, the clauses ensuring that covenants are enforceable领先 发表于 2025-3-29 03:30:31
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Potential Externalities of the Bilateral Governance Systemem of covenants. First, it will describe the concept of delegated monitoring, as this theory provides a suitable starting point for analysing potential externalities of a bank’s conduct after a covenant default. Subsequently, the potential positive externalities of providing information as well as afaddish 发表于 2025-3-29 11:42:11
Results: Covenants as a Reciprocal Private Governance Creditor Protection Systeme results for the covenant’s enforcement out of court will be described and discussed. Subsequently, the findings for potential negative externalities will be presented and analysed. This will be followed by the presentation and subsequent discussion of potential positive externalities. Finally, thePOLYP 发表于 2025-3-29 16:09:49
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