NAUT
发表于 2025-3-25 03:51:38
Hierarchical Contracting: A Mean-Volatility Control Problemerial performance metrics which are optimal to the top manager may not necessarily be optimal to the principal. Another numerical example shows that the profit-sharing features of middle managerial contracts can be desirable for a sufficiently large firm, but not for a sufficiently small firm.
我还要背着他
发表于 2025-3-25 10:57:34
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-34397-4ement in various forms. We briefly review the history of modern contract theory and discuss basic issues in contracting decisions which eventually boil down to tradeoffs between risk/uncertainty sharing and incentives.
无政府主义者
发表于 2025-3-25 14:34:12
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Incisor
发表于 2025-3-25 16:09:35
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真实的你
发表于 2025-3-25 23:58:51
P. F. Cavagnaro,C. R. Galmarini moral hazard, the optimal contract decision is a tradeoff between the benefit of improving the agent’s work incentives and the cost of sacrificing the risk-sharing efficiency, and that the optimal performance metric for the optimal contract is a combination of the outcome and relevant signals which
GRIN
发表于 2025-3-26 04:12:49
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墙壁
发表于 2025-3-26 04:52:56
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机制
发表于 2025-3-26 12:06:17
Techniken der Verifikation und Validierung,e study effects of learning on the optimal contract. In particular, we examine two cases: (1) a parameter is an unknown constant and (2) it is an unknown BM process with a linear drift. The first case extends the Holmström–Milgrom model by allowing the information about the unknown parameter to be u
公猪
发表于 2025-3-26 13:29:02
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Arthropathy
发表于 2025-3-26 19:55:31
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