休息 发表于 2025-3-23 11:20:05
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Path Leaks of HTTPS Side-Channel by Cookie Injectionn URLs visited by the victim, exploiting cookie-path matching vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer, Edge, Safari, etc. With experiments, we investigate several popular cloud storage services and demonstrate that most of them (including Google Drive and Dropbox) are vulnerable to such attacks. The isELATE 发表于 2025-3-23 21:43:49
http://reply.papertrans.cn/24/2362/236126/236126_13.pngUrologist 发表于 2025-3-23 22:38:35
Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design9th International WoFAWN 发表于 2025-3-24 02:48:45
Secure Multiplication for Bitslice Higher-Order Masking: Optimisation and Comparisonon. Our main conclusion is that efficiency (or randomness) gains always come at a cost, either in terms of composability or in terms of resistance against horizontal attacks. Our evaluations should therefore allow a designer to select a masking scheme based on implementation constraints and securityorganism 发表于 2025-3-24 07:04:46
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http://reply.papertrans.cn/24/2362/236126/236126_17.pngdragon 发表于 2025-3-24 15:44:38
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Lattice-Based Fault Attacks Against ECMQVnerability of ECMQV against fault attacks and propose two efficient lattice-based fault attacks. In our attacks, by inducing a storage fault to the ECC parameter . before the execution of ECMQV, we can construct two kinds of weak curves and successfully pass the public-key validation step in the pro珠宝 发表于 2025-3-25 02:52:12
Thermal Scans for Detecting Hardware Trojansinal products. This relocation trend creates a need for methodologies and embedded design solutions to identify counterfeits but also to detect potential Hardware Trojans (HT). Hardware Trojans are tiny pieces of hardware that can be maliciously inserted in designs for several purposes ranging from