CHASM
发表于 2025-3-28 17:09:03
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古老
发表于 2025-3-28 19:22:45
Verification of Ptime Reducibility for System F Terms Via Dual Light Affine Logicaddress the problem of typing lambda-terms in second-order .. For that we give a procedure which, starting with a term typed in system F, finds all possible ways to decorate it into a . typed term. We show that our procedure can be run in time polynomial in the size of the original Church typed system F term.
显赫的人
发表于 2025-3-28 23:27:00
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整体
发表于 2025-3-29 03:12:40
The Cassini Cosmic Dust Analyzer,als into sets of strongly normalizing terms. It is shown that upper semi-continuity of such functions is a sufficient semantical criterion for admissibility. To provide a syntactical criterion, a calculus for semi-continuous function is developed.
说笑
发表于 2025-3-29 07:59:04
Semi-continuous Sized Types and Terminationals into sets of strongly normalizing terms. It is shown that upper semi-continuity of such functions is a sufficient semantical criterion for admissibility. To provide a syntactical criterion, a calculus for semi-continuous function is developed.
好忠告人
发表于 2025-3-29 13:48:57
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Oligarchy
发表于 2025-3-29 18:36:18
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Perineum
发表于 2025-3-29 23:24:41
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committed
发表于 2025-3-30 01:35:27
Concurrent Games with Tail Objectivesh tail objectives. We prove the . property for tail objectives, that states for all concurrent games if the optimum value for a player is positive for a tail objective Φ at some state, then there is a state where the optimum value is 1 for Φ, for the player. We also show that the optimum values of .
monochromatic
发表于 2025-3-30 05:11:18
Nash Equilibrium for Upward-Closed Objectives depend only on the current state. We also study the complexity of finding values (payoff profile) of an .-Nash equilibrium. We show that the values of an .-Nash equilibrium in nonzero-sum concurrent games with upward-closed objectives for all players can be computed by computing .-Nash equilibrium