chisel 发表于 2025-3-23 11:09:09

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53421-8res for himself. Then player 2 can either accept or reject this proposal which shows that player 2 faces an ultimatum. If 2 accepts player l’s proposal, player 1 gets what he demanded and player 2 the residual amount. In case of rejection by player 2 we follow the experimental procedure of Binmore,

枯萎将要 发表于 2025-3-23 17:21:57

Candidate Lunar Intrusive Domese players had the possibility to revise their strategies for a new round. The final strategies formed a special kind of equilibrium which can be interpreted as bounded rational equilibrium. An attempt is made to identify bounded rational behavior with subsets of the set of all strategies. A parametr

现任者 发表于 2025-3-23 22:03:41

Candidate Lunar Intrusive Domesst demand or the conflict threat; on the agreement. A computer simulation shows that the dynamic aspiration balance theory has some semi-normative properties such as the convexity of the payoff profile over the aggressivity of the first demand. This profile is shifted and modified by aggressive thre

怎样才咆哮 发表于 2025-3-24 01:45:40

http://reply.papertrans.cn/20/1901/190068/190068_14.png

Resection 发表于 2025-3-24 06:21:26

Radiation Shielding of Lunar Spacecraft, a theory of affiliated auctions (MILGROM/ WEBER, 1982), which predicts expected revenue to be increased by seller’s announcement of public information correlated with the item’s unknown common value..Within-subject ceteris paribus comparisons are obtained by a dual market technique. These within-su

是限制 发表于 2025-3-24 06:45:47

http://reply.papertrans.cn/20/1901/190068/190068_16.png

Foreknowledge 发表于 2025-3-24 12:42:41

Astrophysics and Space Science Library or three periods of no inflation. Two experiments involved no inflation for twelve periods and then inflation at a constant rate for three periods. In all but three markets, participants were asked to guess the mean price of the upcoming market period before they had any information about the param

有权威 发表于 2025-3-24 18:51:25

http://reply.papertrans.cn/20/1901/190068/190068_18.png

睨视 发表于 2025-3-24 21:53:23

978-3-540-50036-0Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1988

精美食品 发表于 2025-3-25 02:02:28

Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systemshttp://image.papertrans.cn/b/image/190068.jpg
页: 1 [2] 3 4 5 6
查看完整版本: Titlebook: Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets; Proceedings of the F Reinhard Tietz,Wulf Albers,Reinhard Selten Conference pro