hereditary
发表于 2025-3-23 11:05:28
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舰旗
发表于 2025-3-23 17:23:44
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多样
发表于 2025-3-23 19:52:54
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84595-5stified. Given premise (1), this prior probability is not itself evidence for the proposition in question, nor does it reflect evidence for the proposition, nor do the facts explaining the high prior probability constitute evidence for the proposition. Hence, it represents a form of non-evidential epistemic justification.
myocardium
发表于 2025-3-23 23:58:42
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84595-5ence, its possession, and evidential support in non-normative terms, we could then use the Path Principle to give a nice, reductive account of justification. It might appear that the Path Principle is platitudinous, but appearances are sometimes misleading. I‘ll raise two kinds of problems for the Path Principle.
Heart-Rate
发表于 2025-3-24 05:43:07
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Intractable
发表于 2025-3-24 09:09:37
A Probabilistic Critique of Evidentialismstified. Given premise (1), this prior probability is not itself evidence for the proposition in question, nor does it reflect evidence for the proposition, nor do the facts explaining the high prior probability constitute evidence for the proposition. Hence, it represents a form of non-evidential epistemic justification.
FILLY
发表于 2025-3-24 11:49:39
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推测
发表于 2025-3-24 18:32:22
0166-6991 ibutions by eminent epistemologists as well as up-and-coming.This volume explores evidentialism, a major theory of epistemic justification. It contains more than 20 papers that examine its nuances, its challenges, as well as its future directions. Written by leading and up-and-coming epistemologists
占线
发表于 2025-3-24 20:13:55
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争吵加
发表于 2025-3-25 02:22:37
Seemings, Reasons, and Knowledge: A Defense of Phenomenal Conservatismdentialism is in the clear though. The real problem for evidentialism isn’t that it’s in danger of being false, but, rather, a mere truism. The action, really, is in the theory of evidence. This chapter defends a theory of evidence, Reasons Commonsensism, that avoids the problems leveled by anti-evidentialists.