BOLT
发表于 2025-3-23 11:07:43
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insomnia
发表于 2025-3-23 14:04:10
Alexander Dufort,Emma Gregory,Tricia Wooo a bargaining game a subset of feasible outcomes rather than a unique outcome. Section 8.3 deals with probabilistic solutions, which assign to each bargaining game a probability measure on the feasible set. In section 8.4 we discuss some extensions of existing solution concepts to bargaining with p
矿石
发表于 2025-3-23 21:33:08
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Amorous
发表于 2025-3-24 01:32:01
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31714-4of the whole player set ., or trivial coalitions consisting of single players, may form. Such a game is described by a characteristic function assigning to each coalition . some subset of ... We call these games coalitional bargaining games in order to keep in line with the main subject of this book
侵略者
发表于 2025-3-24 03:13:30
Mad Science or School-to-Prison?iliar with or not interested in these basics, which underly most of the other material in this book, may skip this chapter or the larger part of it. Only an understanding is required of the definition of a von NeumannMorgenstern utility function, which is presented in section 11.2. Everything else i
口音在加重
发表于 2025-3-24 10:04:11
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Cursory
发表于 2025-3-24 14:33:39
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Organization
发表于 2025-3-24 16:12:17
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不合
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978-90-481-4178-4Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1992
优雅
发表于 2025-3-25 01:37:56
Theory and Decision Library Chttp://image.papertrans.cn/b/image/167722.jpg