值得赞赏 发表于 2025-3-30 10:29:29
http://reply.papertrans.cn/17/1621/162015/162015_51.pngAggrandize 发表于 2025-3-30 15:37:26
Multi-Agent Model of Trust in a Human Gamecing game. This is a trade game on commodity supply chains and networks, designed as a research tool and to be played by human players. The model of trust is characterised by its learning ability, its probabilistic nature, and how experience influences trust. The validity of the trust model is teste抗生素 发表于 2025-3-30 20:15:01
A Counterexample for the Bullwhip Effect in a Supply Chains), and the length of the delay in shipping between firms (one or three weeks) are controlled and compared in the multiagent simulations. We found a counterexample for bullwhip effect such that inventory level of upstream firm was not always larger than that of downstream firm. In addition, contrary下级 发表于 2025-3-30 23:32:11
Collective Efficiency in Two-Sided Matchingif men propose, it produces stable matching which is the best for men and the worst for women, and vise versa. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm with compromise that produce the balanced matching which are almost optimal for both sides. It is an important issue how far agents seek their ownFAZE 发表于 2025-3-31 02:06:09
Noisy Trading in the Large Market Limitf the investment decision of a single “representative” agent. We consider a two-asset pure exchange economy populated by CRRA traders whose individual demands are functions of the past market history. If individual choices are expressed as noisy versions of a common behavior, and the number of agentdilute 发表于 2025-3-31 06:49:34
The Implications of Case-Based Reasoning in Strategic Contextse are guided by a single similar situation they experienced in the past — a simple form of case-based reasoning. The transient dynamics of the model are very dependent on the process by which players learn how to play the game in any given situation. The long-run behaviour of the model varies signif季雨 发表于 2025-3-31 12:02:29
A Model of Myerson-Nash Equilibria in Networkshen, given the obtained graph and its exogenous surplus (the .), they bargain on the split. We claim that, when the surplus from connections is super-additive, the bargaining process can be solved with the . allocation rule, an adaptation of Shapley’s to graphs. This will lead to an (only theoretica放肆的我 发表于 2025-3-31 14:42:48
Market Failure Caused by Quality Uncertainty presence of asymmetric information —i.e. there must exist some reliable quality indicators that can be observed by sellers, but not by buyers. Using computer simulation, this paper illustrates how such market failures can occur even in the absence of asymmetric information. The mere assumption that成份 发表于 2025-3-31 18:43:32
How Do the Differences Among Order Distributions Affect the Rate of Investment Returns and the Contrs among order distributions affect the rate of investment returns (RI) and contract rate (CR). In this study, we compared several order distributions (OD) using U-Mart (Unreal Market as an Artificial Research Testbed), an artificial market simulation system. We also controlled the type of time serieIntractable 发表于 2025-4-1 01:41:06
Blockchain and Trustworthy Systemsmolecules. We explore its success and potential in the analysis of lipids, medicinals, and metal-based compounds by featuring representative studies from mass spectrometry imaging laboratories around the globe.