FLIRT 发表于 2025-3-23 11:38:07
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17370-9international relations; politicsMUTED 发表于 2025-3-24 02:09:29
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7006-9ittees and secretariats either did not exist at all, or not on the British scale, and Cabinet control was correspondingly loose. French foreign ministers often survived the frequent changes of government and so contributed continuity, whether of strength, undulation or weakness. To the end of the ThSpirometry 发表于 2025-3-24 16:14:06
Venita Kaul,Suman Bhattacharjeaat power. Ministers on both sides of the Channel dutifully cultivated the appearance of unity, whether they believed in Anglo-French collaboration as the first principle of their country’s foreign policy or not. But in 1935 the centrifugal forces in Anglo-French relations were too strong to justifyobsession 发表于 2025-3-24 22:12:45
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Te Timatanga: Introduction and Overviewticular. In their defence review for 1935, the Chiefs of Staff noted that British security rested on the assumption that diplomacy would prevent Britain from having to enter a war alone. Without allies, Britain could not fight Japan and Germany at sea; with France as an ally, the Chiefs of Staff tho