VEN
发表于 2025-3-25 04:40:51
Isabelle Gauger,Tobias Nagel,Marco Hubers in the power sector. While a central planner who internalizes GHG emissions via a Pigouvian tax to curb consumption may yield a first-best policy, decentralized mechanisms are typically deployed in OECD countries’ power sectors in order to align the incentives of private power companies with those
新星
发表于 2025-3-25 07:58:24
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sterilization
发表于 2025-3-25 13:59:18
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34111-4we discuss the model of Stackelberg leader–follower oligopoly in the context of electricity markets. The structure of a Stackelberg leader firm with other follower firms that behave à la Cournot is represented by a bi-level problem. It is then recast as a mathematical program with equilibrium constr
Immunoglobulin
发表于 2025-3-25 17:00:19
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meditation
发表于 2025-3-25 23:34:43
Thorsten Reckelkamm,Jochen Deusetor (TSO), whereas generation expansion and operations are carried out by profit-maximizing power companies. Thus, a credible assessment of policy proposals requires a suitable framework that models this distinction between decision makers’ motives directly. Toward that end, we propose a bi-level mo
BLAND
发表于 2025-3-26 03:32:21
Isabelle Gauger,Tobias Nagel,Marco Huberincentives in mitigation of GHG emissions since consumption is not curbed to the same extent as under the first-best policy. Consequently, “too much” renewable energy (RE) investment takes place. This distortion is less pronounced when power companies behave à la Cournot because the exercise of mark
Foreknowledge
发表于 2025-3-26 06:43:32
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阻挠
发表于 2025-3-26 12:02:39
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MEAN
发表于 2025-3-26 16:15:16
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远地点
发表于 2025-3-26 20:37:57
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