不能仁慈
发表于 2025-3-25 06:54:39
Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programmingr’s valuation is drawn from a regular distribution . and that the seller has access to . independently drawn samples from .. By solving a family of mixed-integer linear programs (MILPs), the ERM mechanism is proven to guarantee at least .5914 times the optimal revenue in expectation. Using solutions
Hemiplegia
发表于 2025-3-25 10:37:10
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faucet
发表于 2025-3-25 13:00:30
Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximationet al. recently established that if bidders’ valuation functions are submodular over their signals (a.k.a. SOS), a truthful 4-approximation to the optimal welfare exists. We show existence of a mechanism that is truthful and achieves a tight 2-approximation to the optimal welfare when signals are bi
Clumsy
发表于 2025-3-25 18:23:04
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Dignant
发表于 2025-3-25 19:57:50
Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Valuese one of . different values, and her value for the good is a weakly increasing function of all the bidders’ signals. The bidders are partitioned into . expertise-groups, based on how their signal can impact the values for the good, and we prove upper and lower bounds regarding the approximability of
荨麻
发表于 2025-3-26 03:20:22
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多嘴多舌
发表于 2025-3-26 06:43:29
On Tightness of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis Algorithm for Approximate Nash Equilibrium and 0.36, finally the best approximate ratio of 0.3393 by Tsaknakis and Spirakis (TS algorithm for short). Efforts to improve the results remain not successful in the past 14 years..This work makes the first progress to show that the bound of 0.3393 is indeed tight for the TS algorithm. Next, we ch
orient
发表于 2025-3-26 10:09:10
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驳船
发表于 2025-3-26 14:57:24
Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Gamesto the actions of the other players. They showed that such games admit .-approximate pure Nash equilibria for certain settings of . and .. They left open, however, the question of how hard it is to find such an equilibrium. In this work, we develop a query-efficient reduction from more general games
Ceremony
发表于 2025-3-26 18:56:58
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