GOAT 发表于 2025-4-1 03:21:29

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指派 发表于 2025-4-1 06:58:11

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labyrinth 发表于 2025-4-1 10:18:40

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39684-1uals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant. Although the model is widely studied, no pure game-theoretic version where rational agents strategically choose their location exists. We close this gap by introducing and analyzing generalized game-theoretic models

outskirts 发表于 2025-4-1 16:39:53

Meteorologische Grundtatsachen, decisions and many other scenarios. The idea is to ask the individuals of the same group to assess the performance of the others. Scores or rankings are then determined based on these evaluations. However, peer assessment can be biased and manipulated, especially when there is a conflict of interes

reception 发表于 2025-4-1 19:11:10

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严峻考验 发表于 2025-4-2 02:12:38

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BRIEF 发表于 2025-4-2 03:05:31

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参考书目 发表于 2025-4-2 10:03:52

Der Arzthaftungsprozeß in der Praxisibrium..We describe and analyze one such mechanism called modAVR, which relies on an adaption of the well-known Average Rate (AVR) algorithm for scheduling the jobs. We prove that modAVR combines the aforementioned properties with a constant Price of Anarchy, i.e., despite the fact that it is based

aquatic 发表于 2025-4-2 14:50:43

Meteorologische Grundtatsachen, Moreover, we prove that our two-stage mechanism is asymptotically optimal, since it only needs . queries and we prove an . lower bound on query complexity for any mechanism. Finally, we conduct experiments on several scenarios to demonstrate that the proposed two-stage mechanism is robust.
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查看完整版本: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 11th International S Xiaotie Deng Conference proceedings 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018 Agents.Auction.C