愚笨
发表于 2025-3-28 15:19:16
Designing Budget-Balanced Best-Response Mechanisms for Network Coordination Games However, the performance of these games at equilibrium may be very bad. This motivates the adoption of mechanisms for inducing a socially optimal state. Many settings are naturally dynamical and thus we believe it is worth to consider the design of incentive compatible best-response mechanisms (Nis
SSRIS
发表于 2025-3-28 20:22:05
Inefficiency of Games with Social Contexteory literature. Already for very simple models, it has been shown that altruistic behavior can actually be harmful for society in the sense that the price of anarchy may . as the players become more altruistic. In this paper, we study the severity of this phenomenon for more realistic settings in w
considerable
发表于 2025-3-29 00:21:37
Plurality Voting with Truth-Biased Agentsstructure of equilibrium profiles. These properties demonstrate how the model leads to filtering out undesirable equilibria. We also prove that deciding the existence of an equilibrium with a certain candidate as a winner is NP-hard. We then move on to strong Nash equilibria, where we obtain analogo
从容
发表于 2025-3-29 04:18:59
Friend of My Friend: Network Formation with Two-Hop Benefit-Hop games which are extensions of well-studied games. While the addition of two-hop benefit changes the properties of these games significantly, we prove that in many important cases good equilibrium solutions still exist, and bound the change in the price of anarchy due to two-hop benefit both the
收养
发表于 2025-3-29 09:48:32
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波动
发表于 2025-3-29 12:03:40
Stochastic Congestion Games with Risk-Averse Playersd also admit a potential function if the players have the same risk attitude. On the negative side, we present examples of stochastic games with players of different risk attitudes that do not admit a potential function. As for the inefficiency of equilibria, for parallel-link networks with linear d
轮流
发表于 2025-3-29 16:39:15
Scheduling a Cascade with Opposing Influencesropagate between every two areas. We generalize previous works by studying the problem when people in different areas have various behaviors..We first prove, independent of the planner’s schedule, influences help (resp., hurt) the planner to propagate her idea if it is an appealing (resp., unappeali
bronchiole
发表于 2025-3-29 23:08:08
Der Arbeitsmarkt für Betriebswirtestructure of equilibrium profiles. These properties demonstrate how the model leads to filtering out undesirable equilibria. We also prove that deciding the existence of an equilibrium with a certain candidate as a winner is NP-hard. We then move on to strong Nash equilibria, where we obtain analogo
adj忧郁的
发表于 2025-3-30 03:50:34
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7643-8160-8-Hop games which are extensions of well-studied games. While the addition of two-hop benefit changes the properties of these games significantly, we prove that in many important cases good equilibrium solutions still exist, and bound the change in the price of anarchy due to two-hop benefit both the
aerial
发表于 2025-3-30 05:40:20
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